Wednesday, August 1, 2018
EXTRA OVERSIGHT RECOMMENDED
FOLLOWING the January 17 plane crash that killed six people, the Air Accident Investigation Department has recommended that the Bahamas Civil Aviation Authority "increase its surveillance and oversight of the general aviation sector and put in place policies to reduce the high incidence of unauthorised commercial operations". The plane crash was not the first time a flight operated by a "hacker" has resulted in deaths in the Bahamas, but aviation officials have since pledged an unprecedented effort to clamp down on the "hacking" practice. At a press conference earlier this year, BCAA Director General Captain Charles Beneby said: "Any attempt by a member of the public to engage such services makes that person complicit in an illegal act. This is a warning to all persons that are engaged in such activities, now is the time to stop. We've talked about this before my time. We won't talk about it anymore." Mr Beneby has since said more manpower is needed to properly police the sector, ensuring operators all have requisite certifications. The AAID also recommended in its report that a "plan of action be instituted to ensure all airmen who are owners or operators of foreign registered aircraft are in possession of Bahamas issued licences as required by CAGR". The AAID recommended that surveillance be increased to "ensure all airmen who are owners/operators of foreign registered aircraft, they are in possession of required medical certificates while operating those foreign registered aircraft in the Bahamas airspace." Policies and procedures requiring all valid licence applicants must be familiar with Bahamas' air laws and procedures have also been recommended.
By RASHAD ROLLE
Tribune Staff Reporter
rrolle@tribunemedia.net
THE six people who died in January when the pilot of their plane lost control of the aircraft had zero chance of survival, according to the Air Accident Investigation Department’s report of the crash.
The accident, which killed three men, two women and a ten-year-old girl, “was not survivable due to the high speed, high angle contact (with the ocean) and magnitude of the deceleration forces,” the report said. “All indications were that the aircraft made contact with the ocean straight in (at approximately 180 degrees, nose, propeller and engines first, as evidenced from propeller and airframe signature marks) before cartwheeling several times prior to stopping.”
The January 17 accident off Andros reignited concerns and debate about the aviation sector’s longstanding “hacker” problem which officials have since vowed to address.
The crash report portrays the pilot, Darren Clarke, as a rule-breaker who experienced anxiety flying in non-ideal conditions. It said: “A student pilot that previously flew with the pilot to build flight time stated, ‘I’ve been flying through overcast conditions with him before and I had to calm him down and tell him to trust the instruments inside the plane…if I wasn’t with him then, he might have been gone that day instead.’ Another witness, who had also previously flown with the pilot stated, ‘He was kinda scared of flying in clouds.’ “
On the fateful day, the pilot “failed to maintain control of the aircraft,” the report said, “possibly as a result of spatial disorientation and a lack of situational awareness when he continued flight into meteorological conditions he was not comfortable in. The pilot was not qualified to fly this type of aircraft by ‘instruments only.’ The pilot’s private pilot licence was limited to ‘visual flight rules only’ in a multi-engine aircraft, because he did not demonstrate proficiency using the instruments for navigation in a multi-engine aircraft.”
Citing Wikipedia, the report described spatial disorientation resulting from poor weather, saying: “A pilot who enters such conditions will quickly lose spatial orientation if there has been no training in flying with reference to instruments. If the pilot is not proficient in the use of gyroscopic flight instruments, these errors will build up to a point that control of the aircraft is lost, usually in a steep, diving turn known as graveyard spiral. During the entire time, leading up to and well into the manoeuvre, the pilot remains unaware that he is turning, believing that he is maintaining straight flight.’
Reduced visibility and rain were determining factors in the crash. Investigators said: “Weather conditions were marginal in the area between Nassau and Andros and cloud coverage and bases ranged from 1,800 to 25,000 feet with showers, thundershowers and moderate to severe turbulence. The AAID believes the pilot may have been circumnavigating the marginal weather and reduced visibility and at some point lost control of the aircraft with fatal consequences. He was not authorised to operate any multi-engine aircraft in weather conditions that required use of instruments for navigation because he did not demonstrate instrument proficiency.”
Debris from the crash was strewn far and wide, but the pilot’s log book was recovered in good condition from the side pocket of the cockpit. The documents showed he had completed 129 flights between October 31, 2017 and 2018 for renumeration or hire, none of which he was legally qualified to conduct. Additionally, while the aircraft was designed to carry only five passengers and a pilot at one time, the report said “several flights were documented with as many as eight passengers being carried on the aircraft at any one time.” Investigators also determined Mr Clarke’s pilot’s medical certificate, issued on November 20, 2013, had expired by December 31, 2015. That expiration would have invalidated all privileges a properly certified pilot could exercise, but Mr Clarke still conducted flights between October 31, 2017 and January 18, 2018 with the expired medical certificate.
The Piper Aztec aircraft itself was not defective in any way. Investigators concluded it was properly registered and equipped, adequately certified for operations and in compliance with regulations and procedures. They determined system malfunction did not contribute to the accident.
After the accident, the contacts the pilot made with Air Traffic Services were scrutinised. Investigators detail the interaction in the report, concluding communication or the lack thereof had no bearing on the result. During the episode, air traffic control at one point observed the aircraft “conducting a series of unauthorised changes, climbs and descents and orbits before disappearing from radar contact.”
“The ATS communication facility available to the aircraft after his departure from San Andros was Nassau Air Traffic Control Centre which the pilot utilised,” the report said. “However after contact was made and radar transponder code issued, the pilot inquired into weather conditions after being advised by ATC that he appeared to be heading westbound instead of inbound to Nassau. After advising the aircraft that weather was observed to the southeast and southeast of Nassau, no further two-way radio communication could be established between the aircraft and ATC. ATC attempted to contact the aircraft to find out his intentions with no success; the target was observed turning left as if turning to South Andros. The target was further observed shortly thereafter, turning south, then appearing to orbit, then descending and finally disappearing from radar screen in the ATC radar centre.
“ATC documented at the time of disappearance, the aircraft was heading westward and 8nm east of (the San Andros Airport). Another aircraft in the airspace around the time was engaged by ATC to attempt contact with N62769, also with no success. Two-way radio communication was not a factor in this accident; however, there was a failure on the part of the pilot to respond to ATC’s inquires after being given a transponder code for his inbound flight and water conditions. The reason for the pilot’s failure to respond is unknown.”